Carta Nautica 42 Pdf.rar ((HOT))
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On 12 April 1982, following the 1982 invasion of the Falkland Islands, Britain declared a 200-nautical-mile (370 km) Maritime Exclusion Zone (MEZ) around the Falkland Islands within which any Argentine warship or naval auxiliary entering the MEZ might be attacked by British nuclear-powered submarines (SSN). On 23 April, the British Government clarified in a message that was passed via the Swiss Embassy in Buenos Aires to the Argentine government that any Argentine ship or aircraft that was considered to pose a threat to British forces would be attacked.
Lombardo's signal was intercepted by British Intelligence. As a result, Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher and her War Cabinet, meeting at Chequers the following day, agreed to a request from Admiral Terence Lewin, the Chief of the Defence Staff, to alter the rules of engagement and allow an attack on General Belgrano outside the exclusion zone. Although the group was outside the British-declared total exclusion zone of 370 km (200 nautical miles) radius from the islands, the British decided that it was a threat. After consultation at Cabinet level, Thatcher agreed that Commander Chris Wreford-Brown should attack General Belgrano.
Neither the United Kingdom nor Argentina declared war during the conflict. Combat was confined to the area around and on the Falkland Islands and South Georgia. General Belgrano was sunk outside the 200-nautical-mile (370 km) total exclusion zone around the Falklands, delimited by the UK. Through a message passed via the Swiss Embassy in Buenos Aires to the Argentine government on 23 April, the UK made clear that it no longer considered the 200-mile (370 km) exclusion zone as the limit of its military action. The message read:
A nautical chart that comprehensively shows the Portuguese voyages and the shape and nature of the whole known world, both land and sea, its regions, and its limits as they have been determined in our times, and how they differ from the tradition of the ancients, and also areas not mentioned by the ancients.
In addition to the evidence of images, below in my discussion of the names Waldseemüller gives to the Caspian Sea (see Legend 3.25) I will show that those names come from a nautical chart, and are most similar to the names assigned to the sea on the Catalan Atlas of 1375 and the Catalan-Estense mappamundi of c. 1460.
Haec pro inductione ad Cosmographiam dicta sufficiant si te modo ammonuerimus prius, nos in depingendis tabulis typi generalis non omnimodo sequutos esse Ptholomeum, presertim circa nouas terras, ubi in cartis marinis aliter animaduertimus, equatorem constituti, quam Ptholomeus foecerit. Et proinde non debent nos statim culpare qui illud ipsum notauerint. Consulto enim foecimus quod hic Ptholomeum, alibi cartas marinas sequuti sumus.
All that has been said by way of introduction to cosmography will be sufficient, if we merely advise you that in designing the sheets of our world-map we have not followed Ptolemy in every respect, particularly as regards the new lands, where on nautical charts we observe that the equator is placed otherwise than Ptolemy represented it. Therefore those who notice this ought not to find fault with us, for we have done so purposely, because here we have followed Ptolemy, and elsewhere nautical charts.
At the same time, even while Waldseemüller proclaims that his new world map in the 1513 Ptolemy is based on nautical cartography, certain elements of the map do not derive from that genre: his depiction of Scandinavia and the sweeping rounded coast of eastern Asia clearly derive from one of the world maps by Henricus Martellus (Fig. 1.28).Footnote 178 Waldseemüller had based his 1507 map on a large world map by Martellus similar to that at Yale, so the elements from Martellus in this new world map in the 1513 Ptolemy show that in some ways Waldseemüller was still holding onto this older style of cartography. 2b1af7f3a8